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ABSTRACT 
AN EXTENSIONALIST APPROACH TO ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT: 
WHY QUINE IS MOSTLY RIGHT 
by William Felix Suttle III 
August 2011 
A criterion of ontological conunitment is a formal method for determining what 
objects or entities a themy says exists. The most famous criterion of ontological 
commitment was developed by W.V.O. Quine. However, Quine' s criterion has been 
attacked for presumably not meeting his own standards for an acceptable theory. After 
explaining the motivation and details of Quine 's criterion, I will tum to the prominent 
objections against his tl1e01y. I will argue that there are problems botl1 with Quine's 
formulation of his criterion, as well as the interpretation of Quine 's ctiterion as presented 
by his objectors. In response to these issues, I will present my own criterion of 
ontological commitment. I argue that my criterion of ontological commitment meets 
Quine's standards for an acceptable theory, but is not subject to the prominent objections 
that have been used against his criterion. 
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Ontology is concemed with providing a general theory of what smt of things 
exist. A related meta-ontological issue is dete1mining to what sort of entities a themy is 
committed. To discern the ontological commitments of a theory philosophers employ a 
criterion of ontological commitment. 
The most famous criterion of ontological commitment was developed by Willard 
van Onnan Quine (1908-2000). According to Quine, the ontological commitments of a 
themy are those entities the themy requires as values of the bound variables of 
quantification. Because the existential quantifier, denoted by '(3x)', is the fonna1 
analogue of the ordinary language phrase 'x exists ', first-order predicate logic makes 
explicit the ontological commitments of a themy. I will briefly note several points about 
Quine's criterion, to be discussed in more detail. 
Quine argues that theories presented in ordinary language are ambiguous and for 
this reason ordinary language results in problems when disceming the ontological 
commitments of a theory. Consider a historically salient example. Philosophers have 
argued that the meaningfulness of certain statements containing general predicate terms, 
such as ' is red ' and 'is round' implies an ontological commitment to abstract or universal 
objects. In fact, it is the ordina1y language that has misled these philosophers. Quine 
contends that meaningful statements containing general predicate tem1s such as ' is red ' 
imply no ontological commitment to such purpmied objects. From a Quinean standpoint, 
the reason such statements are not committed to abstract objects is because general 
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predicate terms are not the values of the bound variables of quantification when 
statements containing those terms are tnnslated into first-order predicate logic. 
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A significant implication of Quine 's view is. that by making the existence claims 
of ordinary language explicit, one can eliminate otherwise problematic ontological 
commitments that may be thought to follow from some theories. Tllis is important if one 
is committed to nominalism. Consider that mathematics seems to be ontologically 
committed to the existence of abstract objects that are "numbers." It seems ·that the 
following hue statement, 'There is an even number greater than 1 000', implies an 
ontological commitment to there being some object that is an even number (which is 
surely not a particular concrete object) and this even number has the attribute of being 
greater than 1000. However, from the logical standpoint, a good pmtion of mathematics 
can be translated i?to set themy. One such theory is as follows. Zero is mapped onto the 
empty set, e.g., ' {} ' , one is mapped onto the set with its sole element being the empty set, 
e.g., ' { {}} ', two is mapped onto the set having as its sole element the set containing the 
empty set, e.g., ' { { {}}} ' , and so on. To assert that there is an even number greater than 
1000 requires no more than accepting existential quantification over sets. Thus, while 
ordinary language seems to imply that mathematics is ontologically comnlitted to an 
infinite number of unique abstract objects, via u·anslation into a set themy , one avoids 
ontological conunitment to "numbers." Thus, not only is an adequate criterion of 
ontological commitment significant for discenling the genuine colillllitments of a themy, 
but through formal translation one can avoid othenvise problematic ontological 
commitments. 
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While Quine's criterion is the standard approach to ontological commitment, 
there is some debate regarding its adequacy. Objections to his criterion take three forms. 
First, there are objections based on Quine's use of the theoty of definite descriptions in 
his criterion. On Quine's view, ordinaty proper names can be logically parsed as definite 
descriptions. For example, the ordinary proper name 'Pegasus' can be logically parsed as 
the defmite description, 'the imique winged horse that was captured by Bellerophon' . 
Quine has sound methodological reasons, to be discussed shmtly, for eliminating 
ordinruy proper names from theoretical discourse, but some philosophers ru·gue that the 
theory of definite descriptions is a controversial theory and should play no essential role 
in a theory of ontological commitment. I will show how Quine can meet this objection. 
Second, there ru·e objections based on the adequacy of Quine's criterion in cases 
where theories are onto logically committed to some entity but the entity does not in fact 
exist. Philosophers who raise this objection ru·gue that in such circmnstances Quine 
requires intensional entities to be the values of the existentially bound vru·iables. But 
Quine is explicit that intensionality leads to hopeless theoretical confusion and so should 
be rejected from clear theoretical discourse. I will argue that intensional entities are not 
required for demonstrating the ontological commitments of false theories. 
Finally, some philosophers ru·gue that Quine's formulation of his criterion employ 
modal notions, especially the. notion of necessity, which Quine himself rejects. 
Philosophers who raise this objection argue that not only Quine's fonnulation of his 
criterion but any criterion of ontological commitment that is adequate for discetning the 
ontological commitments of a theory will employ modal notions. In response to this 
argument against Quine 's criterion, I will argue for ru1 interpretation of his criterion that 
requires no modal notions. The overall result is an extensionalist approach to ontological 
cmmnitment that avoids the problems of Quine 's criterion and is not subject to the 
objections that some philosophers have employed against the notion of an extensionalist 
ctiterion of ontological commitment in general. 
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In Chapter II, I will explain Quine's criterion of ontological commitment in detail, 
first concentrating on problems that arise for themies presented in ordinary language and 
so ground his motivation for fmmulating a criterion of ontological commitment in first-
order predicate logic. In Chapter III, I will evaluate the arguments against Quine's 
criterion, specifically those arguments that purp01t to show that his ctiterion requires 
intensional and modal notions. Then I will present and argue for an extensionalist 
approach to ontological commitment that avoids these problems. 
Before turning to Chapter II, I will state some presuppositions. I will not 
presuppose any patticular ontology. Given Quine's commitment to nominalism, it is easy 
to assume that Quine 's criterion is itself a kind of a priori argmnent for nominalism. This 
is not the case. The pmpose of a critetion of ontological commitment is to infmm us 
about what a theory says exists, not tell us what in fact exists. Thus, a guiding principle in 
evaluating a critetion of ontological commitment is that it makes no presuppositions 
about what there is. It should also be noted that a critetion of ontological conunitment is 
only applicable to theories that make claims about what things or smts of things there are. 
Another way of stating this is that Quine's criterion is only applicable to those theories 
that can be translated into first-order predicate logic. Also, I will not consider conditional 
or hypothetical theories of the form: if p is the case, then q is the case. While themies in 
conditional fmm may purpmt to tell what would be the case if something else is the case, 
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they do not explicitly purpmt to tell what is the case. The theories to which a criterion of 
ontological commitment is applicable are those theories that aim to tell in a fundamental 
way the sorts of things populate the actual world. Finally, I will presuppose a bivalent 
fi:amework regarding the truth-values of statements that make assertions, i.e., such 
statements are either tme or false. I now tum to Chapter II. 
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CHAPTER II 
QUINE' S CRITERION OF ONTOLOGICAL COMMJMENT 
Underlying Quine' s criterion of ontological commitment is his claim that ordinaty 
language can result in confusions that lead to mistaken ontologies. One exatnple of a 
problematic ontology sometimes derived from ordinaty language is the view that 
meaningful statements a~·e ontologically committed to referents for gratnmatically proper 
names. Another problematic ontology sometimes de1ived from ordinaty language is the 
view that the some meat1ingful statements are ontologically committed to non-actual-but-
possible entities, i.e., mind-independent entities that do not exist but could exist. I will 
explain Quine's views on each in tum. Ultimately, these problems with ordinaty language 
motivate Quine's employment of first-order predicate logic for developing his criterion. 
Section I: Ordinaty Language atld Ontological Confusions 
A non-referential te1m is a tetm that lacks a referent but is meaningful within the 
context of a statement - there is no object to which the te1m refers. The proper name, 
'Pegasus' is a paradigm example of a non-refening te1m. The view that meaningful 
statements containing non-referential terms are ontologically committed to non-existing 
objects is an ancient position going back at least to Plato. Quine presents his a~·gument 
against this view as a dispute between himself and a hypothetical opponent he dubs 
'McX'. Consider the statement, 'Pegasus does not exist' : 
If Pegasus were not, McX argues, we should not be talking about anything 
when we use the word; therefore it would be nonsense to say even that 
Pegasus is not. Thinking to show thus that the denial of Pegasus cannot be 
coherently maintained, he concludes that Pegasus is. (Quine 1961 , 2) 
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McX's argument intends to demonstrate that statements denying the existence of a 
pmpmted entity, such as Pegasus, are self-contradictmy. In order to deny the existence of 
Pegasus, the statement 'Pegasus does not exist' must be meaningful. The controversial 
premise in the argument is the premise that ptupmts that the proper name 'Pegasus' must 
refer to something if the statement denying the existence of Pegasus is meaningfuL If the 
proper name 'Pegasus' refers to something; it follows that the object referred to by the 
proper name 'Pegasus ' exists. Thus, the statement 'Pegasus does not exist' implies the 
statement 'There is something that the tenn 'Pegasus ' refers to, and tllis something, 
which must exist to be the referential object of the tenn, does not exist' . But that is self-
contradictory. Therefore, Pegasus exists. 
Not many philosophers have found this argument convincing. Most people today, 
philosophers and non-philosophers alike, believe that Pegasus does not exist. At least we 
have no good epistenlic reason to believe that Pegasus exists, and more importantly, most 
of us believe that it is meaningful to deny that Pegasus exists. 
An immediate objection to McX's argument is that it seems capable of"proving" 
the existence of just about anything, e.g., the golden mountain, the flying spaghetti 
monster, etc., so long as the te1m referring to the "object" in question is embedded within 
the context of a meaningful statement. Someone who believes in non-existent objects 
may be inclined to believe in golden mountains and flying spaghetti monsters, but McX's 
argument is a bad argun1ent for such objects. 
Quine claims that advocates ofMcX's argument concede that there is no flesh and 
blood flying horse but that the referent of the term 'Pegasus ' is the idea of Pegasus (1961, 
2). However, whether or not the referent of the te1m 'Pegasus ' is an idea, the statement 
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'Pegasus does not exist' does not deny the existence an idea but denies that there exists a 
flesh and blood flying horse (Quine 1961, 2). Attempting to prove that the object Pegasus 
exists because a statement containing the te1m 'Pegasus ' is meaningful is not only a bad 
argument to suppott the claim that Pegasus exists, but really is not even an argument for 
the existence of Pegasus. 
McX's mistake is to confuse the meaning of ordinary language statements with 
genuine ontological commitments, i.e., confusing words with objects. While some 
ordinary language statements might seem ontologically committed to non-existent 
objects, to hold such a position is to conflate the meaning of a statement with objects that 
may be the referents of terms. Thus, Quine has demonstrated one way in which 
ontological confusion might result from ordinruy language. 
Another ontological confusion that sometimes arises in philosophical contexts is 
the view that the referents of some ordinru·y proper names, such as ' Pegasus,' are 
possible-but-non-actual entities, i.e., possibilia. Possibilia are thought to be objects that 
may or may not be actual. Possibilia ru·e not considered to be simply ideas or mental 
constructs, but real things - although perhaps not things that actually exist. Like the view 
conceming non-existent objects, the confusion that leads to positing una.ctualized 
possible entities again results from the presupposition that ce1tain tenns embedded in 
meaningful statements require referents to accOlmt for the meaning of such statements. 
Quine presents this argument against possibilia as a dispute between himself and a 
hypothetical opponent he calls 'Wymru1' : 
Pegasus, Wyman maintains, has his being as an unactualized possible. 
When we say of Pegasus that there is no such thing, we are saying, more 
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precisely, that Pegasus does not have the special attribute of actuality. 
Saying that Pegasus is not actual is on a par with saying that the Parthenon 
is not red; in either case we are saying something about an entity whose 
being is unquestioned. (Quine 1961, 3) 
Quine attributes to ' Wyman' the view that that there is a special attribute, "actuality," 
which is ttue of some things and not of others. There is a. philosophical tradition dating 
back at least to hnmanuel Kant in the 18th centmy which claims that existence is not an 
attlibute. 1 h1 light of this tradition, we are already supposed to find Wyman's position, 
based on the analogy between the Pruthenonnot-being-red and Pegasus not-being-actual, 
implausible. 
Some philosophers of logic have developed fonnal systems that take into account 
Wyman's distinction between "actuality" and "being." Quine maintains that the 
existential quantifier of first-order logic, denoted by '(3x) ' ru1d read ' for some x' , is the 
fmmal analogue of the ordina.Iy language locution 'x exists ', with 'x' being a variable 
that takes an object as its value. Thus, the values of the vru·ia.bles bound to the existential 
quantifier ru·e objects that exist. Other philosophers, in the spi1it of Wyman, introduce in 
addition to the universal quantifier, '(x)' and the existential quantifier, '(3x)', another 
fmmal quantifier called a 'particulru·' quantifier, denoted by ' Tix'. ' Tix ' is read 'for some 
x ' , but unlike the existential quantifier the variables bound by this pruticular quantifier 
take as their values objects that do not exist, and in the case of purpmted non-actual 
objects, those objects that do not exist but presumably could exist. Both the existential 
and the patticular quantifiers are inte1preted objectually, i.e. , their bound vru·iables take 
1 Sometimes this notion is stated as 'existence is not a predicate' . The word 'exists' is a pelfectly 
acceptable linguistic predicate. What is intended by such claims is that 'existence' is not an attribute that 
some things possess and other things do not. 
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objects as their values. Such fmmal systems that distinguish between an existential and a 
pa1ticular quantifier are called dual-domain systems because the existential quantifier 
ranges over an inner domain of objects that exist, while the pruticular quantifier ranges 
over an outer domain of"objects" that do not exist. 
Now consider a dual-domain system in light of Wyman' s position. Let 'W' be the 
general predicate term ' is a winged horse '. Under the dual-domain view, there is a 
hue substitution instance of: 
(1) (Tix) Wx 
With '(Tix)' taking as the value of 'x ' the possible-but-non-actual object "Pegasus" from 
the outer domain. While 'Pegasus is a winged horse' is not a tme substitution instance of: 
(2) (3x) Wx 
' (3x) ' ranges only over the ilmer domain of actually existing objects, and "non-actual-
but-possible Pegasus" does not exist. The metaphysics underlying this view is that there 
are two distinct ontological categories of objects, those that exist and those that do not 
exist but are "possible." 
One problem for a dual-domain system is clarifying the distinction between 
"actuality" and "being." Beyond the fact that such a distinction seems to unnecessarily 
bloat one 's ontology, many philosophers including both Quine and myself, can make no 
sense of the distinction. In light of this problem a philosopher such as Wyman could 
reject the view that the distinction between actual and so-called "non-actual" objects be 
drawn in tetms of the atu·ibute of "actuality'' but nonetheless might claim that the 
"possible-but-non-actual Pegasus" lacks au atu·ibute that concrete objects possess. What 
Pegasus lacks is not "actuality" but the atu·ibute of spa.tiotemporallocation. Under this 
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view, possibilia are simply abstract objects. While such a view inherits the problems that 
infect the metaphysics of abstract objects, it is preferable to a dual-domain system 
because it does not require an esoteric distinction between things that exist and things that 
do not exist. If there are abstract objects, they are actual objects. 
Quine's response to \Vyman's position is two-fold. First he attacks the 
intelligibility of the notion of non-actual-but-possible objects then he demonstrates that 
positing such entities are not required to account for meaningful statements containing 
non-refening terms. If the very notion of non-actual objects is unintelligible, then it 
makes no sense to posit such "objects" as the referents oftenns. Quine argues that: 
Wyman's over populated tmiverse is in many ways unlovely. It offends 
the aesthetic sense of us who have a taste for desert landscapes, but this is 
not the worst of it. Wyman's slum of possibles is a breeding ground for 
disorderly elements. Take, for instance, the possible fat man in that 
doo1way. Are they the same possible man, or two possible men? How do 
we decide? How many possible men are there in that doorway? Are there 
more possible thin ones than fat ones? How many of them are alike? Or 
would their being alike make them one ... or finally, is the concept of 
identity simply inapplicable to unactualized possibles? But what sense can 
be found in talking of entities which cannot meaningfully be said to be 
identical with themselves and distinct from another? (1961 , 4) 
Aside fi:om viewing these "ontological slums" as unaesthetic, his argument rests on the 
cla.in1 that there is no principle of individuation for unactualized possibles. It is not just 
that it is a mistake to posit such objects as referents for othe1wise non-refening te1ms, but 
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the idea ofunactualized possibles does not even make sense. In Philosophy of Logics, 
Susan Haack explains: "Criteria of identity give conditions for things of a given kind to 
be identical, as: sets are the same if they have the same members, or as: physical objects 
are the same if they occupy the same spatio-temporal position" (43). Note that while 
specifying identity conditions for individuation seems to be asking for an a priori 
criterion, Quine's idea is that it literally makes no sense to say that something exists, 
much less is the referent of a te1m, if there is no idea of what it would really be for 
individuals of that kind to be distinct from one another. 
Haack conectly notes that Quine 's crite1ion of identity may be too strong as a 
standard for the intelligibility of positing entities. For example, she w1ites that many of us 
believe that there are persons, but providing identity conditions for persons is a notmious 
philosophical problem (Haack 43). It also seems clear that physical objects easily admit 
of individuation, but it is arguable that on the quantum level where the objects of interest 
are subatomic pa1ticles, specifying principles of individuation for such subatomic objects 
may be much less clear than it is for ordinary eve1yday objects. By Quine's standards, we 
might have to reject persons and subatomic objects as ''lmintelligible." Thus, even if we 
think of Quine's criteria of individuation as providing a methodological filter for not 
allowing some problematic objects into our ontology, his criterion of individuation may 
filter too much from our ontology. In defense of Quine on this point, even lacking some 
p1inciple of individuation there may be other good reasons to believe that there are 
persons and subatomic pa1ticles, while arguably there are no good reasons for believing 
that there are unactualized possibles. 
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In Dispensing with Possibilia (1976), Ruth Barcan Marcus argues that identity 
conditions for unactualized possibles can be specified. Her identity conditions are based 
on a possible-worlds interpretation of quantified modal logic. According to the possible-
worlds semantics that Marcus employs, the actual world where we exist is represented as 
the set of objects that exist in our world. However, according to Marcus there are also 
other possible worlds. Unlike standard first-order logic, her quantifiers are mapped not 
only onto a domain representing the actual world, but in addition onto domains 
representing other possible worlds. We can think of Marcus' view as similar to the dual-
domain view above, except instead of there being only two circles representing domains 
of discourse, there are an infinite number of circles representing an infinite number of 
"possible worlds." However unlike the dual-domain view, Marcus allows her existential 
quantifier to range over all domains. Thus, from the Quinean standpoint, the objects that 
populate Marcus' possible worlds exist just as the objects that populate the actual world 
exist. 
Marcus takes possibilia to be the objects that populate these various "possible 
worlds." She claims that they are individuated by our stipulating which predicates are 
true of those objects in those various possible worlds (Marcus 44). Whether or not "The 
possible fat man in the domway is bald," depends on what we say a priori. Likewise, the 
identity claim "The possible fat man in the doorway is numerically identical with the 
possible bald man in the doorway" depends on what we stipulate a priori. If we say that 
all of the predicates that are true of the one are also tlue of the other then they are 
numerically the same possible man, otherwise they are not. 
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Marcus ' response to Quine is unsatisfying for several reasons. First, one who is 
suspicious regarding una.ctualized possibles will probably be suspicious about possible-
world semantics as an acceptable themy to provide identity conditions for possibilia. 
After all, both "non-actual-but-possible-worlds" and "non-actual-but-possible-objects" 
are both "non-actual." Marcus ' appeal to possible worlds as an explanation for identity 
conditions for non-actual-but-possible entities is circular. She uses unactualized possibles 
(possible-worlds) to explain unactualized possibles (non-actual-but-possible objects). 
Just as problematic as engaging in circular reasoning is Marcus ' claim that we 
stipulate individuation conditions for unactualized possibles. It is one thing to engage in 
fictitious discourse where we may "describe" Sherlock Holmes as "the detective in the 
deerstalker cap," or Frodo as "the hobbit who canies the ting to Mordor." It is another 
thing altogether to admit, based merely on a cetta.in fonn of discomse, a "non-actual-but-
possible Sherlock Holmes" into our ontology. Descriptions are linguistic items, entities 
are not. Marcus is confusing words with objects. 
Quine's concem is with theories that take non-actual-but-possible entities to be 
the objects of reference for cetiain grammatically proper names. On one hand, if Hobbits 
are fictional entities then Hobbits are mind-dependent fictions. They are on par with 
ideas, and like "the idea of Pegasus," are not the focus of Quine 's argmnent. On the other 
hand, if possible-but-non-actual Hobbits are not mind-dependent fictions, then no sense 
can be made of the notion that a priori stipulated desctiptions substantially create such 
objects. It is not our a priori descriptions of individuals that make those descriptions 
refer, but the fact that individuals are cettain ways that make the descriptions refer. 
I 
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The lack of a clear crite1ion of individuation is only one aspect of Quine's 
argument against unactualized possibles. An equally impmtant aspect of Quine's 
argument is that non-actual-but-possible objects are not required in order to understand 
statements containing non-refening te1ms. Demonstrating this is sufficient to show that 
such statements are not ontological~y committed to unactualized possibles. Like McX and 
Marcus, Wyman's fundamental mistake is to confuse the grammatically proper name 
'Pegasus ' with an alleged object that is supposed to be the referent of the proper name 
'Pegasus' (Quine 1961 , 9). However, at least since the work ofGottlob Frege, analytic 
philosophers have been sensitive to the distinction between meaning and reference.2 
Consider the statement, 'The Morning Star is the Evening Star. ' The singular tenns 
'Moming Star' and 'Evening Star' refer to the same planet Venus. However, 'Morning 
Star' and 'Evening Star ' have different meanings. Thus, meaning is not equivalent to 
reference. 
Once this distinction between words and objects is recognized and obse1ved, the 
arguments from meaningful statements for both non-existent objects and for possibilia 
are dispelled. Of course, this does not entail that there are no such objects, but it does 
demonstrate that making meaningfi.1l statements about non-existent objects is not 
committed to the existence of non-existent objects or unactualized possibles. In fact, 
Quine argues that because ordinruy proper nrunes can be eliminated fi:om theoretical 
discourse in favor of definite descriptions, ordinruy proper names (refening or not) cany 
no ontological commitments . Quine employs Bertrand Russell 's themy of defmite 
descriptions to elilninate ordinru·y proper names from theoretical discourse. 3 The themy 
2 For Frege's classic piece on meaning and reference, see Gottlob Frege (1980). 
3 For Russell 's theory of definite descriptions, see Bertrand Russell (1905). · 
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of definite descriptions maintains that granunatically proper names can be logically 
analyzed as definite descriptions of the fonn 'the so and so.' For example, a proper name 
like ' Pegasus' can be logically parsed as a defmite description of the fonn, 'There is at 
least and at most one winged horse who was captured by Bellerophon, and whoever is the 
winged horse that was captured by Bellerophon is identical to Pegasus ' (Quine 1961, 7). 
Two impm1ant feah1res of a definite description are its existence condition and its 
uniqueness condition. Consider the formalization in first-order predicate logic of the 
proper name 'Pegasus' in tenns of a defmite description: 
(3) (3x) [Wx & (y)(Wy :J (x = y)) & Cxb] 
We read this as, 'There is an x, xis a winged horse, and given any y, xis identical toy 
and x is captured by Bellerophon. ' Quine tmderstands the pln·ase 'there is at least one' in 
tenns of the objectual interpretation of the existential quantifier of first-order predicate 
logic, i .e., to say 'there is at least one x' is to say 'x exists .' After an ordinruy proper 
name is logically parsed as a definite description, ordinruy proper names (whether 
referring or not) ru·e eliminated in such a way that the variables of quantification cany the 
ontological conunitments of statements which contain them. The statement ' Pegasus 
exists ' is hue if and only if the existence condition of the above definite description is 
satisfied, i.e. , if and only if there exists some unique object that is the value of the bow1d 
variable x, and this object is the winged horse that was captured by Bellerophon. 
Impmtantly, conn·ary to views like those ofMcX and Wyman, making statements 
denying that Pegasus exists does not commit one to the existence of Pegasus; it is just to 
deny that the existence condition of a definite desctiption is satisfied. 
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One might object to Quine's eliminating ordinary proper names in favor of 
defmite descriptions because a definite description for a grammatically proper name 
(refening or not) may not always be fotthcoming. It is also the case that defmite 
descriptions will vruy from person to person, and so they depend on what persons 
understand by the proper nrunes in question. For example, for many people the definite 
description pru·sing the proper nrune 'Aristotle' might simply be 'the Greek philosopher,' 
which is a definite description that is (was) satisfied by many individuals. For definite 
descriptions to do the work that Quine requires, i.e., allowing one to eliminate ordina1y 
proper names, it is required that the defmite description in question unambiguously and 
uniquely pick out a referent falling tmder the description, if there is a referent. 
Quine solves this problem by substituting a unique predicate in place of definite 
descriptions when such descriptions might raise problems. He writes: 
In order thus to subswne a one-word nrune or alleged name such as 
'Pegasus' under Russell 's theoty of descriptions, we must, of comse, be 
able first to translate the word into a description. But tbis is no real 
resuiction. If the notion of Pegasus had been so obscme or so basic a one 
that no pat u·anslation into a descriptive phrase had offered itself along 
familiru· lines, we could still have availed ow-selves of the following 
a1tificial and trivial-seeming device: we could have appealed to the e,x 
hypothesi unanalyzable, ineducible attribute of being Pegasus, adopting, 
for its expression, the verb ' is-Pegasus', or 'pegasizes '. The noun 
'Pegasus' itself could then be u·eated as derivative, and identified after all 
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with a description: 'the thing that is-Pegasus', 'the thing that pegasizes ' . 
(1961 , 7-8) 
These predicates se1ve the same purpose as a definite description, namely, to uniquely 
identify an individual ifthere is an individual that is the value of the variable within the 
extension of the relevant predicates. Thus, in the place of the ordinary proper name 
'Pegasus' , Quine employs the predicate 'the individual that pegasizes ' to uniquely pick 
out the object Pegasus, if Pegasus exists. While one lnight think it counter-intuitive to 
employ predicates in this way, the method works from a fmmal and pragmatic standpoint 
and that is sufficient for Quine's pmpose. His unique predicates allow one to eliminate 
ordinary proper names fiom theoretical discourse, in tum allowing one to avoid problems 
that might arise fi·om ordinary proper names and definite descriptions. By eliminating 
ordinru·y proper names we have also shifted the issue of ontological commitment away 
fi·om ordinmy proper names, which adlnit of vagueness regarding reference, and onto the 
vm·iables of quantification. To deny that Pegasus exists is to say that there is no unique 
individual that satisfies the following statement: 'there is an x that pegasizes ' . More 
formally, to deny that Pegasus exists is to affmn a statement from the following 
schematic formula.:' - (3x) Px ', or by quantifier negation: ' (x) - Px ', to be read, 
'everything in the universe is such that it does not have the unique attribute of 
pegasizing'. Therefore, the meaningfhlness of statements containing the proper name 
'Pegasus ' do not imply ontological commitments. 
One might also argue against Quine's account because it has the consequence that 
all statements containing non-refening proper names ru·e false.4 This consequence 
follows from the fact that defmite descriptions require the existence and uniqueness of 
4 See for example, Stephen Read (1995). · 
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their referent in order for the statement containing them to be true. If the existence 
condition of a defmite description is not satisfied, i.e., there is no object to be the value of 
the existentially botmd vruiable when the definite description is translated into first-order 
predicate logic, the statement containing the defmite desc1iption is false. But there seems 
to be a sense in which when I utter the statement 'Pegasus is a winged-horse', I 
sometimes utter a tme statement a11d when I utter 'Pegasus is a mechanical owl ', I say 
something false. While sometimes an existence condition must be satisfied for a 
statement to be tiue, there seem to be tiue statements that not only do not require an 
existence condition to be fulfilled but do not even imply that an existence condition is 
relevant for their tiuth. If I say 'Pegasus is a winged-horse', and someone replies, 'That is 
false, othe1wise, where is this winged-horse you speak of? ' It is cleru· that in some 
ordinary circumstances my interlocutor has misunderstood my utterance. 
Quine responds by conceding that, in a loose sense, there ru·e circumstances in 
which our talk about mythological creatures and fictional stories might be true. For 
example, in "Logic and the Reification of Universals," Quine refers to fictional talk as 
taking an "attitude of frivolity," to be distinguished from the non-frivolous ente1prise of 
natural science (1961, 103). Unless one believes that there is a flesh and blood flying 
horse, what one really means is, 'According to a pru·ticulru· fictional stmy, Pegasus is a 
winged-horse ' . That statement is true, but its tiuth does not depend on there being an 
object that is Pegasus. When our concern is with the ontological commitments of a 
theory, our concern is not with what is tiue according to myth, fiction, etc., but with what 
a theory genuinely says that there is. What a themy says exists is made explicit by the 
range of the themy's bound vmiables. In other words, when disceming ontological 
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commitments, our focus is on theories that make claims about the actual world via 
employment of the existential quantifier. Thus, we can concede that statements of fiction 
are sometimes true, but I will follow Quine in holding that when our concem is with the 
ontological conunitments of theories, such statements are in fact false. 
I will make a final point regarding Quine's approach to eliminating ordinary 
proper names in favor of definite descriptions. There is considerable controversy between 
proponents of the theo1y of definite descriptions and proponents of the causal theory of 
reference. According to the descriptional themy of reference, proper names refer to 
objects via the descriptive content of definite descriptions. Advocates of the causal theory 
of reference contend that proper names, when they refer, are not mediated through the 
descriptive content of descriptions but directly "tag" referents. On the causal theory of 
reference, ordinruy proper names ru·e meaningless "name-tags." It has been ru·gued, for 
example, by Jaakko Hintikka, that Quine's crite1ion of ontological commitment is 
problematic because it presupposes that the descriptional themy of reference is the 
cmTect theory of reference and a criterion of ontological commitment should not 
presuppose such a controversial view as the descriptional theory of reference (Hintikka 
128). But this is a controversial reading of Quine 's position. Quine need not maintain that 
definite descriptions are the meaning of proper names. In fact, his position is consistent 
witl1 the view that such ordinary proper names ru·e meaningless. All Quine requires is that 
from a logical point of view ordinru·y proper nrunes can be parsed as defmite descriptions 
and this is the case, inespective of whetl1er such descriptions ru·e taken to be the meaning 
of those proper names. 
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To SUllllllarize, Quine claims that ambiguity in ordinmy la11guage causes problems 
when disce1ning the ontological commitments of a themy. It is a mistake to think that 
ontological commitments result from the meaningfulness of statements. Such views 
confuse language with objects. The source of this confusion is the view that 
grmnmatically proper names require referents in meaningful statements. As a 
methodological procedure towards sema11tic clarity Quine demonstrates that we can 
eliminate ordinary proper names in favor of definite descriptions. The result is a shift 
away from problematic issues of reference regarding ordinar·y proper names to the bound 
var·iables of quantification. From the va11tage point of ordinary language, it is lmclear· 
when statements, and thus theories couched in ordinaty language, ar·e in fact 
ontologically committed to some purported entities. First-order predicate logic makes 
explicit the ontological commitments of a theory. I will now turn to Quine's view 
regm·ding when a themy is in fact ontologically committed to some sort of entity - his 
criterion of ontological commitment. 
Section II: First-Order Predicate Logic and Ontological Commitment 
Quine argues that his criterion of ontological commitment is a clear· fmmal 
method for explicitly dete1mining the ontological commitments of a themy. Applying his 
c1iterion consists in translating a theory into standard first-order predicate logic and then 
dete1mining what objects are required to be the values of the existentially qum1tified 
bound variables. It is to the values of the bound vmiables that the themy is ontologically 
committed. Before evaluating Quine 's criterion, I will digress to say a few words about 
first-order predicate logic. This is impmtant because there are va1ious interpretations of 
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the vocabulary of standard first-order predicate logic and it would be capricious to 
assume persons have the same inteqxetations in mind. 
All logical systems consist of a syntax and a semantics. The syntax is a string or 
set ofuninte1preted symbols ('symbols' in the sense that they may mean something but 
they need not have any meaning). Of course, in choosing symbols, we often have some 
pmpose in mind regarding the eventual meaning of those symbols. 5 In the case of 
predicate logic the pmpose will be to represent logical relationships between statements 
and specifically, sets of statements called argmnents. The characterizing feature of 
predicate logic is that we can represent the logical relationships between statements by 
taking their "internal" structme into account. Unlike sentential (or "propositional") logic, 
which represents relationships between statements as a whole, predicate logic takes into 
accom1t both the subject and predicate of statements in evaluating logical relationships. 
Thus, in many ways first-order predicate logic is a more inclusive and more powerful 
system than sentential logic; and to the extent that we think of language as coiTesponding 
to facts , fust-order predicate logic is a powerful tool for evaluating the logical cogency of 
theories. 
Standard (sometimes called "classical") first-order predicate logic incorporates, 
along with the syntax and semantics of sentential logic, the following (with some 
deviations). (a) A set of variables denoted by alphabetic letters towards the end of the 
5 The formal syntax of predicate logic (and all logics) are simply token marks with certain shapes, 
e.g., 'a ' is not the 'a ' of the English alphabet, or any other meaningful symbol for that matter. It is just a 
mark that has the same shape as the alphabetic letter 'a '. When developing the fonnal syntax, I refer to 
ce1tain shapes as 'constants', ' variables' , etc. However, when I am doing so. I am refeni.ng to them using 
the meta-language, that is, I am talking about the language of predicate logic. not using the language of 
predicate logic itself. For ease of reading, I anticipate the intended interpretation of the various shapes. 
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alphabet, e.g. ' x ', 'y' , 'z';6 (b) A set of constants denoted by alphabetic letters towards 
the beginning of the alphabet, ' a', 'b ', ' c ', etc. ; (c) A set of general predicate te1ms 
denoted by upper case alphabetic letters, ' P' , 'H ', 'T', etc; 7 (d) The following logical 
constants, 'v' ([inclusive] disjunction), and '~' (negation); (e) The following grammatical 
inscriptions, '(' , ')', and finally; (f) the existential quantifier, ' 3 '. 8 
The universal quantifier, '(x)', sometimes symbolized ' ('v'x) ' , is defined in te1ms 
of the existential quantifier: '(x)' = of '~ (3) ~ x' , and the remaining logical constants, 
'&'(conjunction), ' :J ' (mate1ial implication), and' := ', (material equivalence, or the "bi-
conditional") are defmed in te1ms of the primitive logical connectives, 'v' and'~'. The 
existential and universal quantifiers range over a non-empty domain, or set, of objects. 
These objects are the values of the vruiables of quantification. Thus, the quantifiers tell us 
how many objects from the domain are being denoted. 9 The constants se1ve as names for 
specific objects in the domain, and so may be substituted for botmd variables in 
quantified formulae. Finally, a quantified fonnula renders a hue statement if and only if it 
is the case that there is a statement which is the substitution instance of the quantified 
formula in question. 
With my interpretation of predicate logic in hand, I now tum to Quine's theory of 
ontological commitment. We have seen that ordinary language, and especially ordinary 
6 All variables, collStants, and predicates may contain numerical superscripts , i.e. ' a1' , 'a2 ' , etc. , 
allowing for our vocabulaty to be countably infinite, if necessary. 
7 Sometimes (especially in introductoty texts), general predicate terms are interpreted as denoting 
properties or attributes. I interpret general predicate terms as denoting the set of objects for which that 
general linguistic predicate it tme. At least one good reason for not interpreting general predicate terms as 
denoting propet1ies is because doing so might suggest that there are conjunctive and disjunctive propetties, 
which is a controversial view even among fhends of properties as abstract objects. See David ArfllStrong 
( 1989), especially Chapter V. 
8 While I take 'v'. '-'. and ' 3 ' as prinlitives, and define my vocabulruy in tenus of these. one may 
choose other prinlitives. The end result is the same. 
9 Technically. formal quantifiers ru·e really "functiollS" that take objects in a domain as their 
argument places (the variables) and produce as output statements. 
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proper names, can lead to philosophical problems when attempting to discern the 
ontological commitments of statements and theories. 10 In response to these problems, 
Quine presents a fonna1 criterion for detennining the genuine ontological commitments 
of a theory. In On What There Is, he writes, "A theory is committed to those and only 
those entities to which the bound variables of the themy must be capable of referring in 
order that the affirmations made in the themy be tJue" (Quine 1961, 13-14). Once a 
statement of a themy is translated into standard first-order predicate logic, one looks to 
the bound variables of quantification for that statement's ontological commitJnents. 11 A 
themy is ontologically committed to those pmported objects that are required as values of 
the bound variables of the themy in order for statements in that themy to be tJue. 
Consider a few of Quine's examples employing his criterion of ontological commitment. 
Quine writes: 
We may say, for example, that some dogs are white and not thereby 
commit ourselves to recognizing either doghood or whiteness as entities. 
'Some dogs are white ' says that some things that are dogs are white, and 
in order that this statement be tJue, the things over which the bound 
variable 'something' ranges must include some white dogs, but need not 
include doghood or whiteness. (1961 , 13) 
1° For clarification, on Quine's view, it is not persons that are ontologically conunitted, but 
theories. While this may seem unintuitive at first, when we consider that a person can be mistaken about 
the ontological commitments of a theory that she accepts, the idea of theories being ontologically 
committed seems plausible. 
11 In particular, we look to the bound variables of the existential quantifier. One might object on 
gretmds that the existential quantifier is definable in tenus of the universal quantifier and that the universal 
quantifier often may not cany ontological commitment, e.g., mliversally quantified statements are trivially 
tme in a (logical) universe where no objects exist. Om focus when developing a criterion of ontological 
commitment is its applicability to theories that make claims about the actual world, and so any theory 
translated into first-order predicate logic that canies an ontological conunitment in virtue of the existential 
quantifier will also cany an ontological commitment when the existential quantifier, by quantifier negation. 
is read in terms of the universal quantifier. 
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Quine's view is that the statement ' Some dogs are white' is ontologically committed to at 
least one white dog in virtue of the fact that at least one white dog is required as the value 
of the existentially bound variable. Consider a translation of ' Some dogs are white' in 
first-order predicate logic: 
(4) (3x) (Dx & Wx) 
A universe where there are no white dogs is a universe where ' Some dogs are white' is 
false. TI1e truth of the statement 'Some dogs are white' depends on there being at least 
one white dog and the quantification f01m of this statement makes its commitment 
explicit. Notice that our criterion of ontological commitment can make explicit the 
ontological commitments of ( 4) without presupposing any ontology. However, under 
Quine's view, (4) is not committed to there being an entity that is 'whiteness', as the 
general predicate tenn 'white ' is not bound by an existential quantifier. Only the object 
that is the value of the variable 'x' is bound to the existential quantifier. 
Consider an example offered by Quine that canies an ontological commitment to 
abstract objects. He w1ites: 
When we say that some zoological species are cross-fe1tile we are 
committing ourselves to recognizing as entities the several species 
themselves, abstract though they are. We remain so committed at least 
until we devise some way of so paraphrasing the statement as to show that 
the seeming reference to species on the pa1t of our botmd variable was an 
avoidable manner of speaking. (1961, 13) 
Consider the statement 'Some zoological species are cross-fe1tile ' , translated into first-
order predicate logic: 
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(5) (3x) (Zx & Cx) 
Just as there must be at least one thing that is a white dog for our previous example to be 
true, here, there must be at least one value of the bound variable 'x ' that is a cross-fe1iile 
zoological species. However, many of us do not usually think of the term 'species ' as 
denoting concrete individuals (while of course, the members of the species are concrete 
individuals)Y Thus, this statement under Quine's theory of ontological commitment is 
committed to the existence of abstract objects, in this case, a "zoological species," as 
such an object is required as the value of the existentially bound variable. 
An impmtant aspect of Quine 's fonnal criterion of ontological commitment is that 
it not only demonstrates what a theory says exists but it also provides an explicit formal 
method for determining when a themy is not committed to some purported entities. We 
have seen this aheady where Quine demonstrates that ordina1y proper names within the 
context of meaningful statements are not ontologically committed to referents. 
Fmthermore, in the above examples, we see that the employment of general predicates 
terms in first-order logic do not carry ontological commitments. It is impmtant to keep in 
mind that for Quine the ontological commitments of a theory are what a the01y says there 
is, not what there is. Thus, our criterion of ontological commitment is applicable to any 
themy as an imprutial standard that can applied to theories independently of whether the 
themy that the criterion is applied to is conect or not. A nominalist may ve1y well be 
interested in showing that a pruticular tl1e01Y is committed to Platonism without him or 
herself accepting the themy as conect. 
12 Some philosophers of biology, see er;pecially David Hull (1 976) argue that species are concrete 
individuals, with the members of those species being temporal parts of the scattered object that is the 
individual concrete spec.ies. Setting aside the cogency of this view, we simply note that one who accepts 
this view should, under Quine's view, have no problem quantifying over species (although one may 
disagree with Quine conceming the natme of what it is that one is quantifying over). 
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I have explained Quine 's criterion of ontological commitment. I will now turn to a 
central objection to Quine's criterion, namely, that his criterion cannot be formulated in a 
way that is both adequate as a general method for discerning the commitments of a theory 
but also meet his own standards for the intelligibility of a themy. 
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CHAPTER III 
EXTENSIONALITY AND ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT 
A prominent objection in the literature against Quine's criterion of ontological 
commitment is that it seems to employ intensional notions, and in pa1iicular, modal 
notions. A modal context is a statement that incorporates the notions of possibility or 
necessity. The truth-values of statements in intensional contexts are not truth-fi.mctional, 
that is they depend for their truth on factors other than the truth-values of the non-
intensional components of those statements. For example, the statement 'There are eight 
planets in our solar system' is true or false relative only to the number of planets in our 
solar system. Such a statement is said to be a statement in an extensional context. By 
contrast, the truth or falsity of the statement 'Necessarily, there are eight planets in our 
solar system' depend on factors other than the number of planets that populate our solar 
system, e.g., what sort of 'necessity' one is talking about, in what sense might the solar 
system had been different, etc. 13 According to Quine 's own standards of theoretical 
clarity, intensional notions are ambiguous and so are not suitable for clear discourse. If 
Quine's criterion cannot be fmmulated in a way that does not employ intensional notions 
then his criterion is just as problematic as the other theories that he rejects on intensional 
grounds. 14 While there are several philosophers who argue that Quine 's criterion cannot 
be adequately formulated in a non-intensional way, I will concentrate on Michael 
Jubian's The Intensionality of Ontological Commitment. 15 Given Jubian's argmnents 
13 Inespective of whether there are eight planets in our solar system, some people are inclined to 
believe that our universe could have been otherwise, such that there might have been ten planets or even no 
planets: and so however many planets there actually are, they believe that it is not necessarily the case that 
there are this actual number of planets. 
14 Quine rejects propositions (as "meanings" of statements), non-logical modalities, and all 
abstract objects other than sets, on intensional grmmds. 
15 For example, Richard Cartwright (1954) argues for a similru· conclusion. 
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against Quine's criterion, as well as problems with Quine' s own way offonnulating his 
criterion, I will defend an interpretation of his criterion that is extensional and is not 
subject to Jubian's objections. First I will explain the distinction between intensional and . 
extensional contexts since this distinction is central to the objections against Quine 's 
criterion. 
Section I: Extensionality and Intensionality 
The extension of a te1m is the set of objects to which the te1m refers . For example, 
the extension of the term 'dog' consists of the set of particular dogs that presently exist. 
Some te1ms, such as ' God' , may have only a single object in its extension, while some 
te1ms, such as 'Pegasus ', have no extension, or an empty extension. The truth-value of a 
statement in an extensional context depends on the objects in the extension of the te1ms 
that comprise the statement. For example, the statement, 'All dogs are canines ' is a 
statement in an extensional context: its tmth-value depends only on the extension of the 
te1m 'dog' and the fact that the general predicate te1m 'is a canine' is true of all objects 
that are dogs. 
Statements in intensional contexts depend for their truth-value on factors other 
than the objects refened to by the tetms that comprise the statement. These other factors 
might be related to what one believes, what one knows, what might be the case, etc. In 
pa1ticular the truth-value of statements in intensional contexts depends on the meanings 
of the statements in question. A test to determine whether a statement is extensional is 
whether the statement satisfies substitutivity salva veritate for co-extensional te1ms. 
'Salva veritate' is Latin for 'Prese1ving the truth'. Non-logical tenns, 'x' and 'y' are 
substitutable sa Iva veritate in a statement if and only if substituting 'x' for 'y' , or vice 
versa, is logically guaranteed to not alter the tmtb-value of the statement in which they 
are substituted. For example, consider the following statements in an epistemic context: 
Lois Lane knows that Supetman is a hero, 
and 
Lois Lane A:nows that Clark Kent is a hero. 
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The first statement is tme (in the fictional story of "Supetman"), while the latter is false. 
However, the terms 'Superman ' and 'Clark Kent' have the same extension- the object 
that is Superman/Clark Kent. The truth-values of these statements, which contain the 
epistemic notion 'knows that' depends on factors other than the extension of the tenns 
'Clark Kent' and ' Superman' . The context of the statements above containing the 'knows 
that' operator is not extensional because the substitution of the term ' Supennan' with the 
co-extensional tenn 'Clark Kent' is not logically guaranteed to preserve the tmth-value of 
those statements. Thus, epistemic contexts are considered to be intensional contexts. 
It is important from Quine's standpoint that his criterion of ontological 
commitment be extensional, since he claims that intensional contexts are at best 
ambiguous and at worst, such as he argues regarding quantified modal logic, 
unintelligible. Quine has several reasons for claiming that intensional contexts are 
problematic. One reason, as we have ah·eady seen, is because identity conditions for 
intensional entities are problematic. Another reason he views intensional contexts as 
problematic is because intensional contexts depend on meaning for their tmth. He argues 
in his Two Dogmas of Empiricisrn ( 1961 ), no non-circular account of the concept of 
meaning can be provided and so the vety notion of meaning itself is at best ambiguous. 
To say that two statements have the same meaning is to say that they are synonymous. 
But to say that two statements are synonymous is just to say that they have the same 
meaning. Independent of the extensional ctiterion of substitution salvo veri tate, there is 
no test for detetmining whether two statements have the same meaning. The ptimary 
objection in the literature to Quine ' s criterion of ontological commitment is that any 
adequate ctiterion of ontological commitment, including his own, will include some 
intensional notions and therefore will fail by his own standards of clarity. 
Consider several passages where Quine presents his ctiterion of ontological 
commitment; I note in italics the language he uses that seems to employ intensional 
contexts. In his Ontology and Ideology, he wtites: 
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The ontology to which an (interpreted) themy is committed comprises aU 
and only the objects over which the bound variables of the theory have to 
be construed as ranging in order that the statements affirmed in the themy 
be true. (Quine 1951, 11) 
In On What There Is, he wtites, "A themy is committed to those and only those entities to 
which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of refetTing in order that the 
affmnations made in the themy be true" (Quine 1961, 13-14) Finally, he wt·ites in 
Existence and Quantification (1971): 
Another way of saying what objects a themy requires is to say that they are the 
objects that some of the predicates of the themy have to be tme of, in order for the 
themy to be true. But this is the same as saying that they are the objects that have 
to be values of the variables in order for the themy to be tlue. (95) 
These fonnulations employ phrases like 'have to be' and 'must be ', which are usually 
considered to be intensional locutions. Given Quine 's reservations regarding intensional 
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contexts, fi:om his vantage point it is serious problem for his criterion if it cannot be 
formulated in an unambiguously extensional way. After all, the very point of his criterion 
is to provide a clear method for dete1mining the existence claims of a theo1y, and for 
Quine intensional contexts are paradigm ambiguous contexts. I will now critically 
evaluate Jubian' s objection to Quine' s criterion. 
Section ll: Jubian' s Arguments and My Criterion of Ontological Commitment 
In his The lntensionality of Ontological Commitment (1972), Michael Jubian 
argues that any adequate characterization of Quine's criterion of ontological commitment 
requires intensional notions. An adequate C1ite1ion of ontological commitment is one that 
successfully demonstrates what a particular themy says exists. As Jubian notes, there is 
no problem providing an extensionalist crite1ion of ontological commitment to theo1ies 
that are committed to entities that actually exist. He claims the problem for Quine, and in 
general for any extensionalist, is the adequacy of a c1iterion of ontological commitment 
regarding themies that are committed to some purpmted entity and that entity does not 
exist. After all, a criterion of ontological commitment should be able to demonstrate not 
only the ontological commitments of tme theories, but the ontological commitments of 
any theo1y. One reason that a philosopher might reject a themy is because of its 
ontological commitments. For example, a crite1ion of ontological commitment should be 
able to demonstmte that the themy of vitalism is ontologically committed to an elan vital, 
even though there is no elan vital. Jubian claims that a c1iterion of ontological 
commitment cannot do tllis without incorporating intensional notions. I will argue that 
Jubian is mistaken. 
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According to Jubian, Quine's ctiterion of ontological commitment expresses a 
binaty relation between a theory and that to which a theory is ontologically committed 
{Jubien 357). The problem of intensionality arises when one asks: to what exactly is it 
that theories bear the relation of ontological commitment? There is no problem for the 
extensionalist regarding tiue theories, as there is an object to stand in relation to the 
themy regarding that themy's ontological commitments. According to Jubian 's 
interpretation of Quine, this relational reading consists of a theory assuming the existence 
of some entity. To say that a theory is ontologically committed to some entity is to say 
that the themy assumes the existence of that entity. For example, quantum physics is 
ontologically committed to electrons if quantum physics assumes that there are electrons. 
Presupposing Quine's notion that to be is to be the value of a bound variable, Jubian 
coiTectly notes that we rule out the following logical characterization of Quine's 
ctiterion: 
(6) (3x) (T assumes x) 
We read (6) as 'There is an x, T assumes x' , where' T' is a theory and 'x' is a variable 
expressing T's ontological commitments (Jubien 357). While (6) adequately charactetizes 
Quine's view that the ontological connnitinents of a themy are the values of the bmmd 
variables of quantification, (6) is only if Tis ontologically committed to an entity that 
actually exists. To show that (6) is inadequate in circumstances where the ontological 
commitments of a theory fail to exist, consider the themy of vitalism. The themy of 
vitalism claimed that there is an elan vital, i.e., a " life-force." Thus, under (6) we have, 
'There is an x (the value of which is the elan vital), and vitalism assumes x'. Of course, 
while vitalism assumed that there is an elan vital, there is no object to be the value of the 
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variable bound to the existential quantifier under the vitalism themy. On the objectual 
interpretation of the quantifiers in standard first-order logic, to which Quine is 
committed, a theory assessed under fonnulation (6) could not be ontologically committed 
to a prupmted entity and that entity fail to exist (Jubien 357). Clearly, a themy can be 
ontologically committed to the existence of an entity and yet that assumed entity to which 
the theory is cmmnitted fails to exist. 
One approach to ontological commitment when dealing with theories that are 
ontologically committed to an entity but that entity does not exist is to distinguish 
between those constants that have referents and those that do not in one's formal system. 
Such logical systems are called free logics. In free logic, only those constants that have 
referents are legitimate candidates for existential generalization. Consider existential 
generalization in standard first-order predicate logic: 
(7) Fa --7 (3x) Fx Existential Generalization (EG) 
In standard first-order predicate logic, EGis valid only on the condition that the constant 
denotes an object in the domain of discomse (for om pmposes, the domain is the actual 
universe). Because staudard first-order predicate logic does not allow non-refening 
constants, EG is unrestricted and thus always a valid inference within the system. 
However, because free logics allow non-referring tenns, existential generalization is only 
conditional~y valid; EGis valid only on the condition that the constant being generalized 
on has a referent. Free logics incorporate an existence predicate 'E! ' to make fonnally 
explicit that a particular constant has a referent. Free logic pe1mits a revised version of 
EG: 
(8) Fa, E!a --7 (3x) Fx Free Logic Existential Generalization (PEG) 
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Under (8), that there is an elan vital does not logically follow from the hue statement 
'Vitalism assumes that there is an elan vital ', as FEG is not pennitted on that statement -
FEG is permitted only on statements containing te1ms that genuinely refer. Thus, a free 
logic fmmulation of a criterion of ontological commitment does not have the drawback of 
presupposing that Ts ontological commitments actually exist. 
However, a free logic fmmulation of a criterion of ontological commitment is not 
acceptable for an extensionalist. To extend classical first-order predicate logic to allow 
for non-refening te1ms introduces intensionality into fo1mallogic. After all, if a te1m 
does not refer, then a fortior; it cannot be used in an extensional context. To extend 
standard first-order predicate logic in favor of free logic would unde1mine Quine's 
extensionalist motivation for employing standard first-order predicate logic in the first 
place. 
In response to the problem raised by a free logic interpretation, one can maintain 
that a themy's ontological commitments are to classes or sets. A set is simply a collection 
of objects. Consider for example quantmn physics, which assume for the sake of 
argument, is ontologically committed to the existence of electrons. Under a set-theoretic 
inte1pretation of ontological commitment, quantum physics is cmmnitted to the set of 
electrons, and in particular, committed to the set of electrons not being the empty set. To 
the extent that quantum physics is correct, the set of electrons is a non-empty set with 
electrons as members. When a theory is conunitted to the existence of some entity, but 
that "entity" does not exist, the 'x ' in 'T assmnes x ' denotes the empty set. 
This set-theoretic interpretation of Quine's criterion is both extensional and 
furthe1more raises no problems for char·acterizing the ontological commitments of 
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theories that are committed to some purported object and yet that object fails to exist. 
Because the existentially bOlmd variables of fa lse theories denote the empty set, no 
intensional entities or non-refening te1ms are required, as sets provide paradigmatic 
extensional contexts. However, Jubian claims that a problem for a set-theoretic 
characterization of ontological commitment is that all theories for which there fail to be 
an object corresponding to their commitments ultimately have the same ontological 
commitment - namely, to the empty set (359). Thus, according to Jubian, under a set-
theoretic characterization of a criterion of ontological commitment, if 'Pegasus ' and 
'Count Dracula' denote the empty set, we nonetheless require intensionality because we 
require an understanding of the meaning of statements containing the tenns 'Pegasus ' and 
'Cotmt Dracula' in order to distinguish between the ontological commitments of different 
statements containing those tenns. 
There are at least two problems with Jubian's objection to the set-theoretic 
inte1pretation. The first problem is that he shifts the issue of ontological commitment 
away from the bound variables of quantification, and to what one understands by a 
pruticular the01y. Jubian is con·ect that we do not understand a statement asserting the 
existence of Count Dracula and a statement asserting the existence of Pegasus to have the 
same ontological commitments; surely a child can be an advocate of the one theory and 
yet not the other. However, Quine 's criterion is a methodological tool. As such, his 
criterion itself is not concerned with what one believes or understands concerning the 
nature of the objects asseiied to exist in a particulru· ontology. Quine's goal is to give an 
extensional method that can be applied to theories as a way of detetmining what objects, 
if any, the the01y requires in order for the theory to be true. A statement asserting that 
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Dracula exists and a statement asserting that Pegasus exists require different objects in 
order to be t:Iue, but from the extensional point of view, both are false for the same 
reason, there is no object in either case to be the value of the variables bound by the 
existential quantifier. There is no problem with stipulating that in false statements that 
assert the existence Pegasus and Cmmt Dracula, that the names 'Pegasus' and 'Count 
Dracula' or their defmite descriptions, denote the empty set, while nonetheless 
recognizing that such statements require different non-empty e..:-ctensions for their truth. 
Such statements are simply false in virtue of their bound variables taking the empty set as 
their values, while requiring non-empty extensions to be t:Iue. What one understands by a 
statement or themy is inelevant to determining the ontological commit:Inents of the 
statement or themy in question. 
Another problem with Jubian's objection to the set-theoretical interpretation is 
that he presupposes that proper names, such as 'Pegasus', cany the ontological weight of 
statements. Quine eliminates ordinary proper names in favor of definite desctiptions for 
the very reason that they cause problems for detennining the genuine ontological 
commit:Inents of theories. Once proper names are eliminated fi:om theoretical discourse in 
favor of defmite descriptions, and in pmticular in favor of Quine's unique descriptive 
predicates, the values of the existentially bound variables detennine the ontological 
commit:Inents of a theory. The result is that there is no intensional problem with 
stipulating that in the false statement 'there is m1 x that pegasizes' the predicate 
'pegasizes' denotes the empty set, m1d noting that the definite description requires a non-
empty extension for a statement that it is embedded in to be tme. Whatever may be 
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understood by the predicate 'pegasizes ' is an issue for the object-language ontology that 
asse1is that there is something that satisfies the predicate in question. 
Another, perhaps more problematic, objection that Jubian raises against Quine 's 
c1iterion for ontological commitment is that Quine, in fonnulating his criterion, explicitly 
employs phrases like "must be the value of the bound variables." Prima facie, the te1m 
' must' seems to cany modal connotations and therefore statements containing the term 
'must' generate intensional contexts. Jubian is conect that Quine' s use of such phrases in 
formulating his criterion is lmfortunate because it suggests a modal interpretation of 
Quine 's. Because Quine rejects intensional contexts, his employment of seemingly modal 
connotations in fmmulating his criterion poses a serious problem. However, I now argue 
for a reinterpretation of Quine's criterion that employs no modal tenninology and is 
adequate for determining the ontological commitments of any themy, therefore 
vindicating Quine 's c1iterion of ontological commitment against Jubian's objections. 
Critical to an adequate extensional ciitetion of ontological commitment is a 
careful distinction between meta-language and object-language. A meta-language is a 
language that we use to talk about an object-language. For example, ordina1y English is 
the meta-language used to talk about first-order predicate logic. Because a critetion of 
ontological commitment is a meta-theoretic ciiteiion that applies to themies in order to 
detetmine what those theories say exist, I will first describe a simple object-language 
themy to use as a. test case for my criterion of ontological commitment . As noted earlier, 
Jubian concedes that there are no intensional problems for detennining the ontological 
conunitments of theories that are committed to objects that actually exist. I will pmposely 
stipulate a false themy as my test case because it is false theories that Jubian claims 
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require intensional notions and so it is false theories that raise problems for an 
extensionalist criterion of ontological commitment. Given that a criterion of ontological 
commitment should not presuppose whether a theory is conect, it should be able to 
dete1mine the ontological commitments of false theories v.rithout incorporating 
intensionality. I will demonstrate that my criterion adequately dete1mines the ontological 
commitments of my example object-language theory without requiring modal or 
intensional notions. 
I will take as my test case object-language themy a fo1mal theory that contains a 
single statement asse1ti.ng the existence of Pegasus. Following Quine, I eliminate the 
ordinary proper name 'Pegasus' in favor of a definite descriptive predicate the uniquely 
picks out Pegasus, if Pegasus exists, i.e., 'The x that pegasizes'. Again, this simply 
eliminates any ambiguity regarding issues of reference for ordinary proper names. In 
first-order predicate logic we have the following object-language fonnaliza.tion of a 
statement asse1ting the existence of Pegasus: 
(9) (::Jx) Px 
Read, 'There is (exists) an x that pegasizes'. Under Quine's fmmulation, we dete1mine 
the ontological commitments of (9) by asking what objects are required to be the value of 
the bound variable 'x'. Assigning the actual universe as our domain of discourse, (9) 
requires that there be an object in the actual universe that uniquely pegasizes. 
When we ask what is required for the truth of (9), we are explicitly working in the 
meta-language, i.e. , we are asking about tl1e truth conditions for the object-language 
existence asse1tionrnade by (9). Generalized, when we are concemed witl1 dete1mining 
the ontological conunitments of a tl1emy we are always asking a meta-theoretic question 
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about that the01y. As noted earlier, the problem that Jubian raises against Quine's 
formulation is his employment of the ordinary language locution 'must' , which is usually 
given a modal connotation. I will eliminate any use of modal te1ms like 'must' and 'have 
to be' altogether from my meta-language characterization of a criterion of ontological 
conunitment, and instead ask: what are the necessmy conditions for the tmth of (9)? In 
(10) below, I use boldface to denote meta-theoretic variables ranging over the object-
language statement under consideration. I now propose the following criterion of 
ontological commitment: 
(1 0) (x) (Tis ontologically committed to x, only if - Px ~ -1) 
(10) takes the actual universe as its domain of discourse. ' T' denotes a statement in the 
object .. language that makes an existence assett ion. In the present case, ' T is a meta-
theoretic variable ranging over the object-language asse1tion 'there is an x that 
pegasizes'. Thus, according toT, there is an object within the extension ofthe defmite 
description 'the x that pegasizes ' . (1 0) states that it is a necessary condition for the truth 
of' T is ontologically conunitted to x' that there is an object in the actual universe within 
the extension of the definite description ' the x that pegasizes ' . The antecedent, following 
the 'only if', states that if there is no object in the actual universe that pegasizes then Tis 
false. 
The logical f01m of (1 0) is 'p only if q' . 'p ' is the antecedent and ' q 1 is the 
consequent. (1 0) states that the tmth of 'q 1 is a necessa1y condition for the truth of 'p ' . At 
this point, one might suspect that I am sneaking in modality by my employment (in the 
meta-language) of a 'necessary condition' . However, no modal notions are required to 
forma lly explicate a necessary condition for the tmth of a conditional statement. To say 
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that 'q' is a necessary condition for 'p' is to say nothing more than if' q' is not tme, then 
'p' is not tJ.ue. Another way of expressing this is that there is no assignment of h1lth-
values to 'p' and 'q', such that 'p' is tJ.ue and 'q' is false. Consider for example, let the 
proper name 'Bear' name a dog that actually exists. It is a necessa1y condition that the 
statement 'Bear is a mammal ' be tJ.ue in order that the statement 'Bear is a dog' be flue. 
Thus, if the statement 'Bear is a dog' is u·ue, there is no assignment oftmth-values such 
that 'Bear is a mammal' is false. No modality is required to f01mally explicate the tmth 
conditions for statements of the f01m (1 0). Of course, my meta-theoretic account of 
ontological commitment does not exclude object-language theories from making modal 
assextions, e.g. , 'Bear is a dog only if Bear is a mammal' might be interpreted by some as 
a claim employing nomological (or "law-like") necessity. My concem however is not 
with the ontological relation between being a dog and being a mammal, or for that matter 
with any pruticular object-language themy, but with a meta-theoretic criterion for 
detennining an object language the01y's ontological commitments, and for that, I have 
demonstrated that no modality is required. 
Now it is only left to demonsu·ate that my f01mulation succeeds where Jubian 
finds purely extensional fonnulations of a criterion problematic. As presented above, 
Jubian contends that a problem facing an extensional criterion of ontological commitment 
is tl1e ability to detennine the ontological commitments of theories which ru·e 
ontologically committed to a purp01ted entity and that pmpoxted entity does not exist but 
without incorporating intensionality. I again take as my test case a statement asse1ting the 
existence of Pegasus, and show that my criterion adequately determines the ontological 
commitments of this statement without inco1porating intensionality. 
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Under my criterion, we state in the meta-language that 'Tis ontologically 
committed to x' is tme, only if, there is a true statement derived :fi:om, '- Px :::J- T '. The 
bold face text is meta-theoretic variables ranging over the object language. In the meta-
language (we are talking about 1), this is to say that a true statement of the fonn '- Px :::J 
- T ' is a necessary condition for the tmth of' Tis onto logically committed to x' . That 
there is a unique object in the domain of discourse, i.e. the universe, that pegasizes, is a 
necessru.y condition for a hue statement derived from '(3x) Px', i.e. 'T. Namely 'if it is 
not the case that there is an object that pegasizes, then the theory assetting the existence 
of Pegasus is false ' adequately captmes the notion that the statement asserting the 
existence of Pegasus is ontologically committed to Pegasus. No intensionality is required 
to be the value of the bound variable because if the extension of the description 'the x 
that pegasizes' is empty, we simply stipulate that the extension of the 'the x that 
pegasizes' is the empty set. 
I have argued that (10) is a purely extensional criterion of ontological 
commitment that is not subject to Jubian's claim that any adequate criterion of 
ontological commitJ.nent will employ intensional notions. While it is unfmtunate that 
Quine employed locutions such as 'must be' and 'have to be' in his fonnulation of his 
criterion of ontological commitment, I have demonstrated that one need not employ such 
locutions. My criterion employs no modal or intensional notions and handles the 
problematic circumstances of false theories for which Jubian argued could not be 




Philosophers employ a criterion of ontological commitment to determine what 
entities a the01y requires in order for that the01y to be tme. While a criterion of 
ontological commitment does not tell us what there is, it tells us what a the01y says there 
is. W.V.O. Quine developed the most famous ctiterion of ontological conunitment. 
According to Quine, a theory is onto logically committed to those entities that are required 
as the range of the bound variables of existential quantification. 
Quine's criterion has been attacked for presumably not meeting his own 
extensionalist standards. In particular, he employs phrases like 'must be ' and 'have to be' 
in f01mulating his criterion and these phrases are usually thought to be intensional 
locutions. This raises problems given Quine explicit rejection of intensional notions. 
I presented the central argument against Quine's ctiteiion, proposed by Michael 
Jubian, that any adequate critetion of ontological commitment will employ some 
intensional notions. While it is lmfortunate that Quine uses intensional locutions in his 
formulation, I argued for an altemative interpretation of Quine 's criterion that is both 
adequate as a criterion and employs no modal or intensional notions. 
The end result is an extensionalist c1iterion of ontological commitment that can be 
methodologically applied to theories in order to determine what is ontologically required 
on the prut of those theories . Given that a core question in philosophy concerns what s01ts 
of entities there are, and that often it is not cleru· what ontology a the01y might be 
committed to, my ref01mulation of Quine 's criterion contributes a significant 
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achievement for ontology as a discipline and for the use of the formal resources of fn·st-
order predicate logic in making the ontology of a theory explicit. 
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